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Abstract
The European Migration Crisis is increasingly linked to an exponentially rising threat of terrorism 
in Europe and a rapid disintegration of the EU’s security and integrity. However while the narrative 
of the terrorist ‘wolves’ hiding among the refugee ‘sheep’ becomes increasingly prevalent, 
little quantitative analysis has been made to substantiate it. This paper seeks to interrogate the 
evidence behind a key claim prevalent in that narrative; that ‘lone wolf’ terrorists have entered 
Europe under the cover of the crisis. On the basis of the available data, this paper contends that 
such a threat is minimal, the crisis presenting a social problem rather than a security issue.
Keywords: Lone Wolf; Terrorism; Europe Migration Crisis; Threat
Introduction
In 2015 a record-breaking 1.3 million people applied for asylum in the European Union, sparking 
what has become known as the “European Migration Crisis” (hereafter EMC)[1]. Of these, 29% 
(378,000) were fleeing Syria, nearly 15% (193,000) from Afghanistan while another 9.7% (127,000) 
came from Iraq[2]. By the end of the second quarter of 2016 another 305,700 asylum seekers had 
applied for internal protection in the EU[3]. This wave of migration coincided with a string of deadly 
terrorist attacks, the largest of which struck Paris (2015), Nice (2016) and Brussels (2016), killing 
hundreds and injuring more than a thousand. These attacks, and the use of the crisis as ‘cover’ 
for the infiltration of some of the attackers, legitimised fears that the ‘migrant tide’ brought with it 
the proverbial ‘wolves in sheep’s clothing’, and once inside, that Europe’s Schengen Area of free 
movement would allow such terrorist ‘wolves’ to strike anywhere in the EU[4]. Non-refoulement 
clauses in the European Convention on Human Rights mean that even when suspected extremist 
or political criminals are detected among refugees, returning them to their country of origin may be 
illegal, granting them an opportunity to wander Europe (potentially unmonitored)[5]. Many European 
countries have begun re-imposing border controls invoking the ‘exceptional circumstances’ clause 
of the Schengen Zone, and some doubt these ‘temporary measures’ will prove temporary[6].
[1] Pew Research Center, “Number of Refugees to Europe Surges to Record 1.3 Million in 2015”, August 2016 p.4
[2] ibid, p. 9
[3] Eurostat, 2016 asylum in the EU Member States, Media release, 22 September, Eurostat, < http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/
documents/2995521/7662180/3-22092016-AP-EN.pdf/22f5de3b-b5a8-4195-82fe-3072a4a08146 > accessed 30/8/2017
[4] Kelly Greenhill, 2016 “Open Arms Behind Barred Doors: Fear, Hypocrisy and Policy Schizophrenia in the European Migration Crisis” European 
Law Journal Vol 22 No. 3 pp 317-332
[5] Maarten Bolhuis, Joris Van Wijk, 2015, “Alleged Terrorists and Other Perpetrators of Serious Non-Political Crimes: The Application of Article 
1F(b) of the Refugee Convention in the Netherlands” Journal of Refugee Studies Vol 29 No. 1 pp 19-38
[6] Greenhill, op cit  pp 317-318
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Nevertheless, while fear and rhetoric appear to drive policy, with the notable exception of the Paris/
Bataclan attack there is little evidence supports the contention that the migrant crisis has aided the 
infiltration of pre-formed terrorist ‘cells’. Europol reports and the analysis of other attacks in the 
section below highlight the predominance of local actors (existing residents and citizens) rather 
than apparent asylum seekers, as the instigators of violence[7]. If anything, the predominant flow of 
militants appears to be in the other direction; by 2015 it has been estimated that more than 2,000 
‘foreign fighters’ had left from Germany, the UK, Belgium, the Netherlands and Denmark, with 
only around 20% returning[8]. During the same period Islamic State media endeavored to dissuade 
residents of the conflict zones from seeking asylum on foreign shores, urging them to stay and 
fight instead[9]. More recently, however the consistent loss of Islamic State territory over the last 
18 months has reversed this trend somewhat as escaping foreign fighters seek to return home[10]. 
Finally, not all attacks are carried out by organised cells. Increasingly ‘lone wolf’ or single attacker 
incidents (such as the Nice truck attack) are drawing the attention of policy makers and academics 
alike. This paper seeks to assess the incidence of radicalised migrant ‘lone wolves’ as an alternative 
terrorist threat. After specifying the methodology, the paper will compare unaffiliated actor attacks 
from the ‘peak’ of the EMC between 2015-16 with data from the five years previously. The trends 
present in this data, as well as an overview of conceptions of radicalisation which explain them, will 
then be presented. Ultimately, this paper will argue that despite popular narrative, crisis migrants 
do not pose a significant terrorist threat to Europe.
Methodology
The issues of sudden migration and political refuge span across many factors, from economic and 
cultural concerns to the value of individual human security. Already some authors have begun 
exploring the issues of prejudice and fear produced by the crisis[11]. Others have examined the 
issue of ‘weaponised migration’ directly threatening the structure and integrity of the European 
Union[12]. In this way, migration is understood by policy makers as “a form of barbarian warfare” not 
dissimilar to the sacking of Rome[13]. Very little, however, has focused on assessing the objective 
risk actually posed by the migrants themselves[14]. This paper seeks to address this gap, providing 
an exploratory quantitative analysis of the objective threat of unaffiliated actor terrorism posed by 
incoming crisis migrants, and a brief outline of the actors who have committed them. Data for this 
paper will be sourced from the Global Terrorism Database, as well as Europol’s annual European 
[7] ibid, p. 6; Boaz Ganor,  “An Intfidada in Europe? A Comparative Analysis of Radicalization Processes Amongst Palestinians in the West Bank 
and Gaza Versus Muslim Immigrants in Europe” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 34 (No 8, 2017): 587-599, pp 592-593
[8] Lasse Lindekilde, Preben Bertelsen & Michael Stohl, 2016, “Who Goes, Why and With What Effects: The Problem of Foreign Fighters from 
Europe” Small Wars & Insurgencies 27 No 5: 858-877
[9] Europol, op cit pp 25-26; for an example of such propaganda from the source see “From the Battle of Al-Ahzab to the War of Coalitions” Dabiq 
11, Islamic State, <http://www.clarionproject.org/docs/Issue%2011%20-%20From%20the%20battle%20of%20Al-Ahzab%20to%20the%20war%20
of%20coalitions.pdf > accessed 30/10/2016 pp 22-23
[10] Anne Speckhard, Adrian Shajkovci & Ahmet Yayla, “What to Expect Following a Millitary Defeat of ISIS in Syrai and Iraq?” Journal of Terrorism 
Research 8 (No 1, 2016): 81-89, p. 82; Martin Gallagher, “the 2016 ‘Lone Wolf’ Tsunami- Is Rapoport’s ‘Religious Wave’ Ending?” Journal of 
Strategic Security 10 (No 2, 2016): 60-76, pp 74-75
[11]ibid; Pew Research Center, op cit; Alexandros Sakellariou “Fear of Islam in Greece: Migration, terrorism and “ghosts” from the past” Journal of 
Nationalism and Ethnicity 45:4, 2017 pp 511-523
[12] Grenhill, op cit; Fabrizio Tassinari, 2016 “The Disintergration of European Security: Lessons from the Refugee Crisis” Prism Vol 6 No 2 pp 
71-83; Thomas Nail,  “A Tale of Two Crises: Migration and Terrorism after the Paris Attacks” Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism 16 (2016 No 1): 
158-167
[13] Greenhill op cit, p. 158
[14] Erika Brady recently undertook an assessment of European Security in the wake of the migration criss, though her analsys provided little 
context for who was committing the attacks and how, focusing instead. Additionally, a recent study by Bove and Böhmelt undertook to make a 
detailed, worldwide quantitative assessment of the relationship between migration and terrorismWhile an undoubtedly worthwhile study, their 
results were somewhat diffuse, analysing migration generally (rather than crisis/conflict-induced migration driving the EMC), and the timeline (from 
1970-2000) limits any applicability to the actors and ideologies that have become the focus of the so-called ‘war on terror’. See Erika Brady, “An 
Analysis of Patterns of Change Arising form the Syrian Conflict: Islamic Terrorism, Refugee Flows and Political Destabilization in Europe” Journal 
of Terrorism Research 8 (2017): No 1: 53-67; Vincenzo Boe, Tobias Böhmelt, “Does Immigration Induce Terrorism?” Journal Of Politics 78 No 2: 
572-588
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Union Terrorism and Trend Report[15]. Additional information on specific case studies will be sourced 
from available publications, reports and news releases. It will focus on the apparently emergent 
threat of unaffiliated ‘lone wolf’ terrorist actors; self-radicalised individuals or small groups who 
undertake to commit an attack without direction from a higher organisation[16]. The inquiry will 
compare such attacks committed with a professed Islamist or Jihadi ideology, that have occurred 
in Europe in the five years leading up to the crisis (2010-2014), and those that occurred in its 
peak between 2015 and 2016. In approaching these incidents, only reasonably identifiable acts 
of religiously or politically motivated violence will be addressed. Non-terrorist incidents involving 
recent migrants, such as the wave of sexual assaults experienced across Germany in New Years 
of 2015/16, will be excluded. Ambiguous cases and competing reports, where present, will be 
identified. This approach will be taken so as to contain the scope of the inquiry to the extant 
terrorist threat posed by recent migrants, rather than a statement on European security generally.
The Lone Wolf Threat  
In recent years, great concern has arisen around the possibility of radicalised migrants committing 
‘lone wolf’ attacks[17]. ‘Lone wolf’, lone actor or ‘stray dog’ attackers have no direct connection with 
any existing terrorist organisations, though they may act in response to propaganda from one[18]. 
‘Lone wolves’ may latch on to any number of ideologies, blending them with their own personal 
grievances[19]. Their independence means traditional intelligence sources (Signals or Human 
Intelligence) have very little to trace, making them notoriously difficult to detect before an attack[20]. 
Most importantly, a ‘lone wolf’ attack can come from any segment of the population, and need not 
necessarily be motivated by ‘conventional’ or mainstream extremist ideology.
The primary question for this analysis then, is to what extent (if any) are recent migrants/asylum 
seekers (having arrived in Europe) more vulnerable to ideological radicalisation and subsequent 
violent action than the existing population? In other words, does the migration crisis exacerbate 
the existing potential for lone wolf attacks beyond the effects of population increase?[21] The 2016 
European Terrorism Situation and Trend Report presents the view that Sunni Muslim Diaspora are 
“... a real and imminent danger... that will probably continue to exist for a long time” that may be 
“specifically targeted by Islamist extremist recruiters”[22]. This concern is highlighted in previous 
[15] National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2016). Global Terrorism Database. Retrieved from 
https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd The GTD is an open-source database of terrorist events from around the world, maintained by the National 
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) and the University of Maryland. For the purposes of this study, data sets 
were constructed by filtering the results to “Western Europe”, and excluding cases that did not meet (or were ambiguous) all three of the GTD’s 
criteria for terrorism. For notes on their collection methodology and the criteria, please see their website. Datasets used in this analysis in CSV 
form are available from the author, or may be freely replicated by following this methodology on the GTD website.  
[16] There is some contention as to how ‘alone’ such actors may be and still considered truly ‘lone wolves’. Hamm & Spaiij contend such a 
definition should be contained to only the actions of a single individual (Mark Hamm & Ramoon Spaaij, The Age Of Lone Wolf Terrorism [Colombia 
University Press: New York 2017]). Others, such as Simon, allow for individuals acting with support from one or two others, but not connected to a 
wider organisation (Jeffrey Simon,  Lone Wolf Terrorism: Understanding the Growing Threat [Prometheus Books: Amherst, 2013]). For the purposes 
of this analysis the exact numbers are not important, what is is whether these actors have connections with transnational or local organisation 
which provides funding, resources or exerts command and control over the cell. When these connections are absent, those actors will be 
considered “unaffiliated”. The use of the term ‘lone wolf’ is only relevant insofar as it has become popular in both public and academic discourse.
[17] Marco Funk & Roderick Parkes, Refugees versus Terrorists European Union Institute for Security Studies January 2016 p. 2; Europol, op cit p.26
[18] Brian Jenkins, 2011, Stray Dogs and Virtual Armies: Radicalization and Recruitment to Jihadist Terrorism in the United States Since 9/11 
Occasional Paper,  Rand Corporation: Santa Monica; Peter Phillips, 2011 “Lone Wolf Terrorism” Peace Economics, Peace Science and Public 
Policy” 17, No 1: 1-29
[19] Edwin Bakker E & Beatrice de Graaf  “Lone Wolves: How to Prevent this Phenomenon?” in Expert Meeting: Lone Wolves; How to Prevent this 
Seemingly New Phenomenon’ ICCT – The Hague < https://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Bakker-deGraaf-EM-Paper-Lone-Wolves.pdf >
[20] Henry Jackson Society, 2010 “Countering lone Wolf Terrorism: Sustaining the CONTEST vision” Henry Jackson Society May 17 <http://
henryjacksonsociety.org/2010/05/17/countering-lone-wolf-terrorism-sustaining-the-contest-vision/ >
[21] There is also the question of what threat might be posed by lone actors reacting against the recent migration wave.     This violent reaction 
to a perceived ‘tide of Muslim migration’ was demonstrated in the Anders Breivik attacks in Norway, 2011. In combination with recent events (the 
massive increase in migration and incidents such as the New Years Eve Assaults) this path of radicalisation is an undeniable factor in European 
security. Nevertheless, it is not a threat posed by the migrants themselves, and thus is not examined in this paper.  
[22] Europol, op cit p. 7
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works on the ‘homegrown threat’[23]. However, cursory analysis of the perpetrators of lone wolf 
attacks does not support this. Based on data from the Global Terrorism Database, only ten[24] 
separate ‘lone wolf’ attacks of declared Islamist motivation were identified between 2010 and 
2014, from a sample of 860 attacks[25]. Of these, three were conducted by a single individual, 
Mohammed Mera, who committed three separate shootings in Toulouse and Montaban (France) in 
March, 2012[26]. The majority of the attackers (seven of the eight identified) were European citizens, 
five of whom had been born in Europe[27].
Date Location Attacker or Suspect Fatalities Injuries EU Citizen?
14/05/2010 London Roshonara Choudry 0 1 Yes
11/12/2010 Stockholm Taimour Abdulwahb al-Abdaly 1 (attacker) 2 Yes (1992)
11/03/2012 Tolouse Mohammed Mera 1 0 Yes
12/03/2012 Brussles Unknown 1 1 Unkn
15/03/2012 Montauban Mohammaed Mera 4 0 Yes
19/03/2012 Tolouse Mohammed Mera 3 0 Yes
21/03/2012 Paris Suspected – Frederic Jean Salvi 0 0 Yes (Susp)
19/06/2012 Tolouse Unknown 0 1 (attacker) Unkn
22/05/2013 London Michael Adeolajo & Michael Adebowale 1 2 (attackers) Yes (Adeolajo)
21/12/2014 Jous-les-Tours Bertrand Nzohabonayo 1 (attacker) 3 Yes
Totals 12 10
Data Source: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) Global Terrorism Database, table compiled by author 
Table 1: Identified Islamist Unaffiliated Actor attacks in Western Europe 2010-2014, GTD
These figures are similar (though some differences naturally arise from differing methodologies) to 
those presented in Europol’s annual Terrorism Situation and Trend Report across the same period, 
presented below. 
[23] See Ganor, op cit; Bruce Hoffman, “The Evolving Nature of Terrorism” The Social Contract 21, (2010 No 1): 33-40; Nail op cit.
[24] There are two uncertain cases excluded from this set. The first is the failed bombing of a railways station in Bonn (Germany) in 2012. While 
three men were charged with the attack, as well as a planned assassination, there is little to suggest they had links to further terrorist organisations 
such as al-Qaeda (Reuters, “German man given life sentence over failed Bonn bomb attack” Reuters World News April 4, 2017 < http://www.
reuters.com/article/us-germany-security-trial/german-man-given-life-sentence-over-failed-bonn-bomb-attack-idUSKBN175200?il=0 > accessed 
22/08/2017; Die Welle, “Man accused of plotting Bonn station bombing” Die Welle March 14 2014 < http://www.dw.com/en/man-accused-of-
plotting-bonn-station-bombing/a-17498279 > accessed 15/08/2017). That being said, the possibility cannot be conclusively ruled out, as very little 
information beyond the media is available, and detail is sparse. Additionally, the shooting in the Jewish Museum of Belgium, suspected to have 
been carried out by Mehdi Nemmouche, may have been connected to Abelhamid Abaaoud (architect of the November Paris Attacks) (Michael 
Weiss & Hassan Hassan, ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror [2nd Edition, Regan Arts: New York], p. 309). Given this possibility, and the suspect’s known 
travel to Syria, he likewise cannot be fully considered an “unaffiliated” actor, and thus has been excluded from this analysis
[25] These cases were identified as either “Iraqi Extremists” “Jihadi-inspired extremists”, “Muslim Extremists” and in one case (an arson attack on a 
Shi’a mosque in Belgium in 2012), “Sunni Muslim Extremists”.  Some individuals committed multiple attacks, which are registered in the database 
as separate incidents. Where these incidents occurred on the same day, they have been considered in the above data set as a single ‘attack’. 
Attacks on other days are treated separately. This occurs in once case, Taimour Abdulwahab al-Abdaly, has two entries on the same day for the 
failed 2010 Stockholm bombings. As these occurred on the same day they have been considered a single attack in this analysis
[26] START, op cit, Virginie Andre “Mehrah and Breivik: A Reflection of the European Identity Crisis” Islam and Chirstian-Muslim Relations 26 (2015 
No 2): 183- 204 p. 184
[27] Taimour Abdulwahab al-Abdaly, responsible for a failed suicide bombing in Stockholm (2010) and Betrand Nzohabonayo, who attacked 
a police station with a knife in France (2014), were both born overseas (Iraq and Burundi respectively), though they both been citizens of their 
countries of residence for many years.
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Affiliation Religious Left-Wing Right-Wing Separatist Single Issue Not Specified
2010 3[28] 45 0 160 1 40
2011 0 37 1 110 0 26
2012 6 18 2 167 0 26
2013 0(1)[29] 24 0(1)[30] 84 0 44
2014 2 13 0 67 1 116
Totals 11 (1) 137 3(1) 548 2 292
Data Source: Europol Terrorism Situation and Trend Report issues from 2011-2015, table compiled by the author
[28][29]Table 2: Failed, Foiled and Completed attacks in Europe by year and affiliation, 2010-2014 [30]
While some discrepancies are evident, the overall trend of both the GTD and Europol’s own studies 
is reasonably conclusive. In the years leading up to the EMC, while acts of terrorism were present 
in European society the overwhelming majority of them can be attributed to other groups-–most 
notably separatist groups such as ETA and various factions of the IRA, and enduring left-wing 
organisations[31]. These groups ar decades (in some cases, centuries) of history operating within 
Europe. Religiously motivated attacks are a tiny proportion of the overall picture and it is difficult 
to conceive how they may pose in themselves a significant threat to European security or stability.
During the peak of the migration crisis between 2015-2016, a further 20 attacks were committed 
by unaffiliated actors declaring Islamist ideologies (from a sample of 565). Less than half resulted 
in the deaths of anyone other than the attacker, though two-thirds caused some injury. Only two 
attacks (Nice, 2016 and the 2016 Berlin Christmas Market attack) resulted in the deaths of more 
than 10, both were vehicular assaults. Of all the attacks, five appear to have been committed by 
recent migrants (arrived in the last five years), though only two had been committed by people 
who had arrived during the crisis[32]. Additionally, there are some unusual cases – for example the 
stabbing of a soldier in St Julien du Puy was initially reported as a retaliation to French bombing 
in Syria, but at least one subsequent report indicates this may have been since recanted by the 
soldier who was assaulted[33]. Finally, some prominent cases were not included in the analysis. The 
murder of a Polish woman in Reutlingen, despite being committed by a recent Syrian Asylum 
seeker, does not appear to have been motivated by Islamism in any way. It appears to have been a 
simple murder case, rather than an act of terrorism[34]. Finally, there is stabbing of a Police officer in 
Hanover by ‘Sofia S’ in March, 2016[35]. In this case, ‘Sofia S’ may have been in direct contact with 
[28] In the 2010 TE-STAT, this category referred to “Islamist” rather than “Religious”. See Europol, European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend 
Report (TE-STAT) 2011 (Europol: The Hague, 2011
[29]While not listing it, the 2014 report acknowledges “two persons were killed in the UK in two separate terrorist attacks, one motivated by 
religious extremism and the other by right-wing extremist ideology”. Europol, European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-STAT) 
2014 [Europol: The Hague, 2014]). These incidents are (based on correlation with the GTD) the murders of Lee Rigby by Michael Abebolajo and 
Michael Abebowale and the stabbing of Mohammed Saleem by white supremacist Pavlo Lapsyn. It is not clear why these attacks are excluded 
from their reports.  
[30] See above.
[31] Additionally, the GTD dataset incorporates 24 entries coded as “Anarchists”, as well as numerous named organisations with similar leanings. It 
is unknown how such groups are coded by Europol. 
[32] Phillip Oltermann, 2016 “Germany’s first attack by radicalised asylum seeker alarms officials” The Guardian July 20 < https://www.theguardian.
com/world/2016/jul/19/germany-train-attack-could-prompt-rethink-of-counter-terrorism-policy > accessed 30/7/2017; BBC 2016, “Ansbach 
explosion: Syrian asylum seeker blows himself up in Germany” BBC News  July 25 <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36880758 > 
accessed 30/7/2017
[33] Sky News, “Soldier in France Stabbed over Syia – Reports” Sky News 27 May <http://news.sky.com/story/soldier-in-france-stabbed-over-syria-
reports-10295936>; Russia Today, 2016 “Driver shouting ‘Allahu Akbbar’ tried to run over pedestrians in Vienna – media citing police” Russia 
Today Sept. 30 < https://www.rt.com/news/361115-vienna-amok-driver-attack/ > accessed 22/7/2017
[34] Darko Janjevic, 2016 “Police arrest Syrian man after woman killed in knife attack in Germany” Deutsche Welle July 24 2016 <http://www.
dw.com/en/police-arrest-syrian-man-after-woman-killed-in-knife-attack-in-germany/a-19424224> accessed 28/7/2017
[35] Allan Hall A, 2016 “Teenage female ISIS fantatic was ‘radicalised at the age of seven and stabbed a German police officer because she was 
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ISIS representatives, posing some question as to whether it was truly a ‘lone wolf’ attack or directly 
ordered by representatives of the Islamic State[36].
Date Location Attacker or Suspect Fatalities Injuries EU Citizen?
21/08/15 Arras (train) Ayoub El Khazzani 0 3 No
14/02/15 Coopenhaagen Omar Abdel Hamid El-Hussain 2 5 Yes
19/04/15 France Sid Ahmed Ghlam – Suspected 1 0 Yes
26/06/15 Saint-Quentin-Fallavier Yassin Salhi 1 2 Yes
17/09/15 Berlin Rafik Mohaamed Yousef 1 (attacker) 1 No
17/11/15 Bradford Unknown 0 1 Unknown
7/01/15 Paris Tarek Belgacem 1 (attacker) 0 No
11/01/16 Marseilles Not Identified (Minor) 0 1 No
24/03/16 Glasgow Tanveer Ahmed 1 0 Unkn
16/04/16 Essen Yusuf T. Mohamed B. & Tolga I. 0 1 Yes (3)
27/5/16 Saint Julien du Poy Unknown 0 1 Unkn
13/06/16 Magnanville Larossi Abballa 3 (incl. Attacker) 0 Yes
14/07/16 Nice Mohamed Salmene Lahouaiej-Bouhlel 87 (incl attacker) 433 No
18/04/16 Wurzburg Riaz Khan Ahmadzai 1 (attacker) 5 No
26/06/16 Saint-Etienne-du-Rouvray Adel Kermiche & Abdel Malik Petitjean 3 (incl. attackes) 1 1 (Petitjean)
24/07/16 Ansbach Mohammad Daleel 1 (attacker) 15 No
5/10/16 Brussels Hicham Diop – Suspect 0 4 (incl. attacker) Yes
26/11/16 Ludwigshafen Unidentified - Minor 0 0 Yes
5/12/16 Ludwigshafen Unidentified - Minor 0 0 Yes
19/12/16 Berlin Anis Amri 13 48[37] No
Totals 115 521
Data Source: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START) Global Terrorism Database, table compiled by author 
[37] Table 3: Identified Islamist Unaffiliated Actor attacks in Western Europe 2015-2016, GTD
Compared to the previous data set, there has clearly been an increased level of unaffiliated actor 
terrorism in the wake of the migration crisis. Twice as many such attacks (after noted exclusions) 
have occurred in the two years of the ‘peak’ migration crisis as compared to the previous five. 
Again, this is reflected in similar data presented by Europol, though again differing methodologies 
lead to slightly different results. 
unable to make it to Syria” Daily Mail  March 5 <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3476986/Teenage-female-ISIS-fanatic-radicalised-age-
seven-stabbed-German-police-officer-unable-make-Syria.html > accessed 26/7/2017. Due to the offenders age and apparent ‘radical’ family, this 
attack has been removed from the ‘lone wolf’ cases.
[36] ibid
[37] GTD lists injuries as 48, however subsequent media reports this year have presented alternate figures of between 50 and 58 (Berliner 
Zeitung, “Anschlag in Berlin: Zahl der Verletzeten leigt nun bei 56” Berliner Zeitgung 6 March 2017 < http://www.berliner-zeitung.de/berlin/
polizei/anschlag-in-berlin-zahl-der-verletzten-liegt-bei-56-26147624 > accessed 5/09/2017, Samuel Osborne, “Independent “Berlin ‘attack’ as it 
happened: At least nine killed and 50 injured as lorry ploughs into Christmas market” The Independent December 2016 http://www.independent.
co.uk/news/world/europe/berlin-christmas-market-attack-truck-dead-injured-live-latest-updates-kaiser-wilhelm-memorial-church-a7485406.html 
accessed 05/09/2017). 
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Affiliation Jihadist[38] Left-Wing Right-Wing Separatist Single Issue Not Specified
2015 17 13 9 65 0 107
2016 13 27 1 99 0 2
Totals 30 40 10 154 0 109
 Source: Europol Terrorism Situation and Trend Report issues from 2016-2017, compiled by the author
Table 4: Failed, Foiled and Completed attacks in Europe by year and affiliation, 2015-2016
Analysis 
The keys to the ‘lone wolf’ phenomenon are the process of self-radicalisation (the development of 
extreme ideology without direct association with an extremist organisation) and the radicalisation of 
action, that is, the decision to commit an attack (McCauley & Moskalenko, 2014 pp 72-73; Neumann 
2013 pg 873)[39]. The exact process of self-radicalisation is a contested subject, and no clear model 
has gained consensus yet.[40] McCauley & Moskalenko provide two broad profiles for understanding 
the motivations of this form of attacker; the caring-consistency profile (motivated by a perceived 
personal responsibility, a moral imperative to act in the face of injustice, and/or to alleviate broader 
human suffering) and the disconnected-disordered profile (socially isolated, dealing with personal 
grievance and typically suffering from acute or chronic mental health issues)[41]. Baran, in focusing 
on specifically Islamist radicalisation, highlights how extremist ideology can be conveyed through 
ostensibly non-violent organisations such as Hizb ut-Tahrir (the Party of Liberation, HT), acting as 
“a conveyor belt to terrorism”, priming its members for recruitment or radicalisation further down 
the track[42]. In the present decade, that same role can be played through online material produced 
in vast quantities by the Islamic State and others. Other radicalisation theorists seek to delineate 
theological elements and a perceived ‘normalisation’ of Muslims in the literature as the ‘pool’ from 
which ‘lone wolves’ are drawn, arguing that ideology is simply the justification, not the root cause, 
of violent action[43].
While there has certainly been an increase in Islamist violence during the EMC, the contention that 
such violence is brought by the migrants themselves seems difficult to substantiate. Even in the 
face of the recent crisis, only a very small minority of the cases involved recent asylum seekers. In 
those cases, initial reports suggest mental health issues may have been at play[44]. Recent studies 
into refugee mental health have highlighted the extreme psychological stress recent migrants 
experience. In particular, the prevalence of severe cases of Prolonged Grief Disorder and Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder in such migrants can be especially high[45]. This supports McCauley & 
[38] In the 2015 and 2016 reports, this category replaced “Religious Extremism”.
[39] Clark McCauley & Sophia Moskalenko, “Towards a Profile of Lone Wolf Terrorists: What Moves an Individual From Radical Opinion to Radical 
Action” Terrorism and Political Violence 26 (2014 No 1): 69-85; Peter Neumann, “The trouble with Radicalization” International Affairs 89 (2013 No 
4): 873-893. Neumann terms these “cognitive radicalization” and “behavioural radicalisation” (sic) respectively (Neumann, 2013 . 873). There are 
undoubtedly other terms as well, but they reflect essentially the same processes.
[40] Neumann, op cit p. 874.
[41] McCauley & Moskalenko, op cit; Clark McCauley, Sophia Moskalenko & Benjamin Van Son, 2013 “Characteristics of Lone-Wolf Violent 
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recent attack in Nice shows how opportunities may be created through surprisingly simple means. Restricted access to firearms or bomb-making 
materials need not slow down a creative or determined mind.
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[44] Oltermann, 2016 op cit; M Eddy, 2016 “Afghan Teenager Spoke of Friend’s Death Before Ax Attack in Germany” The New York Times July 19 
< http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/20/world/europe/germany-train-ax-attack.html > accessed 27/7/2017; BBC 2016, op cit
[45] G Hassan, P Ventevogel, H Jefee-Bahloul, A Brakkil-Oteo, L Kirmayer,  “Mental health and Psychosocial wellbeing of Syrians affected by 
armed conflict” Epidemiology and Psychiatric Sciences 25 (2016):129-141  131-132
Contemporary Voices, Volume 1, Issue 1 - April 2018 21
Moskalenko’s contention of the disconnected-disordered profile and its prevalence in Lone-wolf 
attacks[46]. But what of the attacker’s motivations? Was it as simple as a psychological snapping 
point or are they driven by an underlying extremist ideology? In the case of the Ansbach Bomber, 
there appears to be little evidence to support the contention that the perpetrator previously held 
any extremist beliefs; one neighbor even claimed he had discussed religion with the attacker 
previously, during which he had outwardly rejected Islamic State’s ideology[47]. The Bavarian train 
attacker, however, is a less clear case; material found in the attacker’s residence and an apparent 
Martyr video released after the attack suggests the teen may have already embraced (in part or 
in whole) extremist ideology preceding the attack[48]. The extent to which he accepted extremist 
views before receiving the news of his friend’s death, or whether this news triggered his ideological 
radicalisation as well is as yet unclear.
Moreover, in both cases clear ‘trigger points’ which appear to have driven the perpetrators to 
violent action can be identified; In the case of the Ansbach attack, the bomber had been rejected 
refugee status and faced deportation, while the 17- year-old Afghan responsible for the Bavarian 
train attack had recently been notified of a friend’s death in Afghanistan[49]. These appear to be 
‘unfreezing’ moments for the attackers, situational crises that pushed them to radical action[50]. 
Alternatively, this evidence may be taken as a validation of critical interpretations of the ‘lone 
wolf’ phenomenon (such as those provided by Kundnani). Idealogical motivations in both these 
cases seem far less prevalent than in other cases of domestic terrorism (from lone-wolf actors 
or organised cells). The psychological stresses evident in their actions likewise highlight causes 
other than politics or religion, even if such ideologies were expressed by the attackers themselves. 
No evidence, however, supports the existence of any ‘conveyor belt’ of Islamist ideology priming 
migrants for terrorist action.
This data generally matches Europol’s own studies which showed that 63% of those arrested on 
terrorism-related charges in 2015 were EU citizens, the majority of which (58% of total arrests) were 
EU born[51]. In 2016 that number dropped significantly, to 437 (43.6%) in 2016[52]. In the vast majority 
of Islamist terrorism cases identified through the GTD (excluding those identified as migrants, 
recent and past, and cases where biographical details were unavailable), the perpetrators were 
descendant of migrants, either second or third generation. This is in line with Ganor’s contention 
that the primary threat of ‘lone wolf’ Islamism comes not from migrants themselves (who are often 
fleeing the horrors of conflict, and enjoy a relative increase in their well-being following migration) 
but from disaffected children who “reject minority status” and begin a process of “downward 
assimilation”[53]. Psychological research has also highlighted the vulnerabilities of second-generation 
adolescent migrants to further stress-factors post-settlement, leading to an increased risk of 
emotional and behavioral problems[54]. Additionally, it is possible that the crisis itself is polarizing 
existing communities within the state and thus feeding the conditions for radicalisation. As it has 
begun to lose it’s ‘local’ war in Iraq, Islamic State media has shifted from the recruitment of foreign 
experts and fighters towards encouraging ‘lone wolf’ actions[55]. Given the massive rate at which 
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attempting to leave to serve foreign groups, and are thus not representative of the lone wolf threat per se (Europol, 2016 pp 10-11). Nevertheless 
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IS still publishes this material, both in their periodical Dabiq and across numerous social media 
platforms, it is possible this campaign will contribute to increasing ‘lone wolf’ radicalisation in the 
future[56]. Nevertheless, such campaigns require a sympathetic ear in order to be effective, often 
relying on exploiting existing issues, such as those outlined above, shaping dissent and anger 
rather than creating it[57]. The ‘lone wolf’ issue is not therefore an extant security threat per se, but 
a potential long-term issue of social policy, integration and mental health.
Conclusion 
While the broader threat the EMC poses to Europe’s security and stability are complex, there are 
a number of false narratives around the threat of terrorism that should be addressed. With the 
exception of the Paris and Brussels attackers (who were in fact citizens rather than true asylum 
seekers), there is little evidence to suggest incoming ‘migrants’ have taken part in organised Islamist 
cells. Though some of those attackers may have utilised the crisis as cover to enter Europe, the 
organised attacks were committed entirely by EU citizens. Moreover, as citizens these attackers 
may well have entered the country through other means without detection (legally or otherwise), 
as other terrorists have before. Unaffiliated radicalisation also appears to be the domain of either 
long-term residents or citizens, with only a handful of recent migrants being identified in this data–
only two who had arrived in the peak of the EMC. That being said, in a minority of asylum cases, 
extreme external psychological stresses combined with ‘snapping points’ such as refused asylum, 
may contribute to a violent reaction such as a ‘lone wolf’ attack. In these incidents, while the 
attackers may invoke popular ideologies, it is more likely the psychological stresses, rather than 
true attachment to a cause, drive their actions. There is a possibility that large waves of migration 
may contribute to populations that are vulnerable to radicalisation; particularly unaccompanied 
adolescent refugees and second generation migrants. Finally, ISIS’s apparently impending defeat 
in Iraq and Syria may reshape the threat landscape somewhat as foreign fighters return to their 
homes, potentially retaining grievances or radical ideologies. Whether these returnees harbour 
sufficient motivation to commit a violent act remains to be seen. Data is likewise lacking on the 
effectiveness of the Isalmic State’s shift towards encouraging lone wolf action, though recent events 
in Manchester and Barcelona suggest that some influence may well be present. More research 
to uncover the processes that drive radicalisation, combined with increased social and mental 
healthcare could well contribute to a reduction in these incidents. Nevertheless, that possibility 
cannot be considered an ‘extant threat’ by any stretch of the imagination, nor can present migratory 
policy be dictated by the potential actions of the next generation. The social challenges posed by 
the EMC are numerous, but migrant terrorism is not among them.
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